

YIELDING TO FILIBUSTERS

SENATE DEADLOCK BROKEN.
A COMPROMISE BETWEEN FRIENDS OF RE-

PEAL AND SILVER MEN.

THE STEERING COMMITTEE'S PLAN.

REPEAL TO TAKE EFFECT ON JANUARY OR JULY
1. 1895-A BOND ISSUE ALSO PROVIDED FOR
THE NEW MEASURE, TO BE PRESENTED
AT ONCE, LIKELY TO PASS BOTH
THE SENATE AND HOUSE,
WHETHER THE PRESIDENT
APPROVES OR NOT.
[BY TELEGRAPH TO THE TRIBUNE.]
Washington, Oct. 13.-A few minutes after 4
o'clock this afternoon, while the dilatory con-
test over the approval of Monday's Journal,
resumed at 10 a. m., was still dragging along
without visible signs of abatement, Mr. Faulk-
ner, of West Virginia, was seen to hurry ner-
vously across the floor of the Senate Chamber
to where Mr. Teller sat and whisper a few
words in the silver leader's ear. Mr. Voorhees,
the luckless and irresolute manager of the for-
tunes of repeal, had left the chamber early in

the afternoon, wearied with the endlessness of the debate on the purely frivolous and dilatory question of the technical correctness of the journal clerk's entries. Mr. Faulkner, his nominal lieutenant, was in charge of the side-tracked Voorhees bill, and represented for the moment all the power and authority of the majority leadership. As he spoke to the Colorado Senator, Mr. Teller's eyes twinkled and his habitually intense and serious expression changed to a gratified smile. He nodded his head quickly two or three times, and his face shone with a strange satisfaction which it has not worn since the contest for and against unconditional repeal began.

THE DEADLOCK AT LAST BROKEN.

Mr. Faulkner's few sentences had an immediate and surprising effect upon the situation in

the Senate, Mr. Butler, who was talking bitterly against the proposed change of rules, had just brought his speech to an abrupt conclusion, and rising at this opportune moment, to the great surprise and mystification of the galleries, Mr. Teller asked leave to withdraw the dilatory motion to amend the Journal which has formed

the basis of the filibustering proceedings of the last three days. Mr. Voorhees, returning to the chamber with equal opportuneness, immediately moved that House bill No. 1 be taken up for consideration. House bill No. 2 was taken up, and Mr. Peffer was recognized to continue the speech begun by him some weeks ago and interrupted for the last time on the evening of October 13. The deadlock had been broken with the consent and by the co-operation of its authors and beneficiaries, and in pursuance plainly of an amicable understanding with the majority. Three minutes after Mr. Teller's request was made and acceded to, scarcely five of the forty or more Senators who heard him make it were left in the chamber, and in half that time the news had spread through the Capitol that the crisis in the repeal fight had been reached and passed, and that the long-looked-for compromise was practically ready for presentation.

EFFECT OF MR. SHERMAN'S SPEECH.

Mr. Faulkner had, in fact, carried across a last flag of truce to the manager of the silver forces. Driven finally to an acceptance of their responsibility as a party for legislation by the stinging sentences of Mr. Sherman, and by the certainty of hopeless internal division if the scenes of the last few days should long continue, the advocates of unconditional repeal within the Democratic ranks had at last yielded to the pressure of numbers and authority, and accepted that inevitable point of compromise which was the only one that was predetermined from the start by the only real personal force within the party—that of Mr. Gorman and his immediate lieutenants. The assurance from Mr. Faulkner that such an agreement was certain to come, if it had not already been concluded, was the motive power of Mr. Teller's willing and eager withdrawal of his dilatory motion, and the sudden and peaceful termination of the three days' deadlock.

The opening of this morning's session had

found the democratic "Steering Committee" still wrestling with the difficult problem of forcing a compromise, and the Administration minority still holding out against the enforcement of the decrees of a party caucus. Mr. Gorman's delicate and self-sufficing diplomacy feared, indeed, to intrust an adjustment of

party differs to the rude shocks and dangerous pitfalls of a caucus debate. To sugarcoat the pill of compromise he was willing, of course, to allow the minority to have at least an ostensible part in its preparation. So to spare the sensibilities of the Democrats like Mr. Mills, whose feelings would be outraged by an application of the rude test of numerical force in caucus, Mr. Gorman soothingly proposed that the "Steering Committee," four of whose eight members were at least friendly to the Administration, should themselves anticipate the work of the caucus and draw up a compromise which would become binding only upon the signature of each Senator to its provisions. This sensible and practical sug-

gestion caught the fancy of the Administration members of the committee, eager to escape an open defeat in caucus or to submit to the imputation of standing aloof from party councils as a refractory minority. The assent of Messrs. Benson, Gray, White and Vilas hav-

had been gained to Mr. Gorman's plan, its execution became practically assured and easy of accomplishment. The "Steering Committee" sat all the morning and a greater part of the afternoon in the Appropriations Committee room, and one by one leading Democratic Senators were summoned from the Senate chamber to give their approval to the compromise measure. To eliminate, so far as might be, all possible points of contention, the "steering committee" wisely selected the simplest form of bill to begin with.

FEATURES OF THE PROPOSED PLAN.

The repeal of the purchasing clause of the Sherman law was to be decreed, of course, in order to give at least a nominal effect to the much-disputed plank adopted at Chicago. But the date of repeal was to be set somewhere: in 1895, either January 1 or July 1, so as to meet the contention that a general Congressional election should intervene

No change was made in the amount of silver to be purchased, in order to forestall any objection from possible filibusters that the compromise gave less to silver than the existing statute.

To conciliate the Administration and the radical Eastern gold men like Senator McPherson, a last-minute amendment was attached, con-

in the power of the Secretary to issue bonds to replenish the gold reserve in his discretion up to a limit, not definitely set, between \$200,000,000 and \$300,000,000.

TWO POINTS FOR ADJUSTMENT.

Thus two single points were left not rigidly agreed on, to be subject to further adjustment, either in the Senate or in co-operation with the representatives of the Administration. One was the date when the repeal should take effect—either January 1 or July 1, 1909. By the advocates of the latter day the argument is